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Abstract:  The model of compensating differentials in regional labor and land markets 
was formalized by Roback (1982).  The model interprets regional differences in constant 
quality wages and rents as compensating firms and residents for inter-regional differences 
in amenities.  While the model assumes that the costs of relocating to a new city are zero,  
the results hold in the presence of moving costs for the marginal migrant.  This paper 
extends the Roback model to allow for moving costs which vary among a city’s residents 
and businesses.  This modification of the model generates new interpretations of regional 
differences in rents and wages.  The theoretical results suggests that the interpretation of 
inter-city rent and wage differentials as compensating is misguided, that such differentials 
are inappropriate as weights in QOL comparisons and stresses the importance of local 
housing and labor market parameters in the determination of these differentials.  The 
importance of amenities is retained, but housing supply becomes the main other 
determinant of regional rents.  Housing supply was ignored in the literature following on 
Roback’s initial insight.  The new perspective also provides a bridge between the neo-
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The formalization of the idea that area differences in wages and rents compensate people 
and businesses for local differences in desirable local amenities is attributable to Jennifer 
Roback (1982).  This important formalization built on Sherwin Rosen’s (1974) seminal 
analysis of markets for bundled characteristics.  An important difference between the two 
models is the use of a representative consumer (and firm) in Roback’s model, as opposed 
to a focus on heterogeneity in preference and cost functions among firms and people in 
Rosen’s paper.  The Roback model also assumed for simplicity that moving costs are 
well approximated by zero.  The addition of migration costs and heterogeneity was not 
seen as a major problem, as all the results of the model should still hold for the marginal 
migrant, defined as a person with zero migration costs.   
 In this paper, we loosen these two assumptions simultaneously, and show this 
change in the model modifies the interpretation of inter-city differences in wages and 
rents considerably.  Intuitively, the presence of heterogeneous moving costs implies that 
at any combination of rents and wages, some people and businesses will be willing to 
locate in a city, given its amenity level.  For the local labor market to be in equilibrium, 
an appropriate amount of residents and businesses must wish to locate in a city.1  The 
quantity side of regional equilibrium is something mostly ignored by Roback and the 
literature that followed her.   For any given amenity level, there are a set of points in rent-
wage-population space that will satisfy local labor market equilibrium.  However, this set 
of points includes a continuum of possible rents, populations and possibly wages.  We 
                                                 
1 Throughout the paper, we will use the term “city” in the urban 
economic sense.  This term is approximated in the census data with 
urban areas or metropolitan statistical areas.  We choose to use city 
because this is the concept the other terms approximate. 
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show that for any given amenity level, rents – and thus wages and population – are 
actually set by the local supply of housing. 
 This paper thus makes two significant contributions.  First, the importance of 
housing supply and other housing market factors in the presence of heterogeneous costs 
to migration substantially changes the interpretation of coefficients in regressions of rents 
on local area characteristics.  This undermines the use of such coefficients as “market 
price” weights in measuring local attractiveness.  For instance, we show that in such a 
context amenities that restrict housing supply will appear more “valuable” than amenities 
that do not.  Thus, in terms of computing local quality of life (QOL) indices, areas with 
amenities that also restrict supply (such as coasts, steep mountains, national parks, etc.) 
will appear more attractive than areas with amenities that do not (such as climate and 
cultural amenities).   
 A second contribution of the paper is that it allows the Rosen-Roback model to be 
related more closely with the newer literature on agglomeration.  The model implies that 
a simple exogenous, productive amenity story cannot account for the positive correlation 
amongst rents, wages and city population we observe in the cross section of cities, with 
the link between population and the other two quantities being especially tenuous.  Since 
the neoclassical assumptions do not imply that more productive cities will be more 
populated, it implies that more populated areas become more productive.  That is, the 
causal relationship runs from population to productivity, not in the other direction.   
While this result is not too surprising, the incorporation of population in the analysis 
(which was missing in the QOL literature) allows for analysis of how population, rents, 
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wages and amenities interact when greater populations of firms and workers leads to 
higher productivity, as has been hypothesized in many papers for a variety of reasons.   
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section I outlines the Rosen-
Roback model and its core results.  Section II incorporates heterogeneous moving costs, 
and shows that the results change substantially.  The implied effects of amenities change 
both quantitatively and qualitatively, with housing market factors playing a significant 
role in the setting of regional rents, wages and populations.  Section III makes some 
extensions of the model.  We discuss the effects of more realistic labor market 
assumptions, the effects of housing supply constraints on the results, and the relationship 
between productivity, rents, wages and city population  A final section concludes with 
some comments on the empirical content of the model, and some further rumination on 
the Rosen-Roback model.   
 
I.  The Rosen-Roback model. 
Roback (1982) envisions a world where all people and business are the same.  A firm is 
characterized by a cost function, which through profit maximization becomes a profit 
function that depends on local wages, rents and local attributes, or amenities.  Costless 
migration implies that firms will relocate to new cities if they can earn higher profits 
there.  In equilibrium, then, it must be the case that economic profits (profits in the city in 
question minus profits available elsewhere) must equal zero: 
1) ( ), ; 0w r Aπ π− = . 
In equation 1, π represents the profits available to the firm in every other location.   
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Similarly, people in the Roback model have preferences, which after utility 
maximization generate an indirect utility function which also depends on wages, rents 
and amenities.  Amenities are defined to be goods for people, although the same 
assumption is not made for firms.  Amenities can either be productive (profit enhancing) 
or unproductive (profit reducing).  Costless migration across cities implies that the utility 
available in any city be identical to the utility available in any other location: 
2) ( ), ; 0v r w A v− = , 
where v is the utility available to a resident in every other location.  As the discussion 
above makes clear 0, 0r wπ π< <  and 0, 0, 0r w Av v v< > >  while πA is indeterminate in 
sign.  Equations 1 and 2 implicitly define Π and V, which are indifference curves for 
firms and people in rent-wage-amenity space.  Figure 1 shows the equilibrium condition 
as usually represented.  For a given level of amenities, rents and wages in a city are 
determined by the condition that firms and residents are indifferent between the city and 
all other cities, and that rents and wages are the same for firms and residents.   
 Within this framework, the effect of amenities on rents and wages are derived by 
taking the derivative of the equilibrium price and wages, as implicitly defined by the 
equality of Π and V.  Equations 3 and 4 show these derivatives and sign them for a 
productive amenity. 
3) 0w A A w





−= >− . 
4) 0A r r A







−= − . 
The signs of these derivatives are also available from the manipulation of the indifference 
curves in Figure 1, as shown in Figure 2. 
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 These results are important, because they provide a theoretical grounding for the 
use of the partial correlation of rents and wages with city characteristics as weights in 
constructing QOL indices, as was done by Roback and many later authors.2  Under the 
model’s assumptions, the regression coefficients that these equations represent are 
appropriate measures of the value of the amenities because they incorporate only the 
effects on utility and profits, and because they incorporate the preferences of both firms 
and residents.  Combining the information from partial correlations of several amenities 
(indexed with k) with wages and rents across several local labor markets (controlling for 
differences in housing and worker quality) the residents’ revealed willingness to pay for 
area Quality of Life (QOL) can be computed and compared across cities (indexed by c), 





⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ c
                                                
 
Rankings of cities based on such indices have been an important part of the amenity 
literature since Roback (1982), and their sensitivity to various changes in specification 
have been examined thoroughly.  More important than the rankings themselves, however, 
is the underlying view of regional equilibrium the rankings represent.  This view allows 
for the interpretation of inter-city differences in rents and wages as compensating 
differentials.  While the rankings of cities may be of little import (in this model, after all, 
utility is the same in all cities), the view of regional price differences as equilibrium 
compensation for differences in quality of life is more fundamental, as it gives inter-city 
price differentials informational content. 
 
 
2 See Gyourko et al. (1999) for a review of this literature.   
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II. Heterogeneous moving costs 
While Roback’s model offers powerful insight into the processes that set regional wages 
and housing costs, it is perhaps too persuasive.  There has been little research into the 
effects on the model of firm and worker heterogeneity and moving costs.  Heterogeneity 
has generally been dealt with in a footnote noting that in its presence, the results hold for 
the marginal migrant.  This marks a major departure from the original hedonic model of 
Rosen (1974), where the entire point is arguably to show the possibility of efficient 
sorting of buyers and sellers.  The possibility of migration costs preventing the 
equilibrium described above was seen as making small deviations from equilibrium 
values possible, but has not been seen as either theoretically or empirically interesting.   
 We make one minor modification to the Roback model.  Firms and residents are 
still assumed to be identical in their preference or cost functions, except for an 
idiosyncratic component representing costs of moving away from their current location.  
Equations 1 and 2 are thus rewritten as equations 6 and 7: 
6) ( ), ; ( )jw r A Fπ π ψ− ≥ ⋅   
7) ( ), ; ( )iv r w A v Gϕ− ≥ ⋅  . 
F(.) and G(.) represents the CDF of the gains to migration for firms and individuals, 
respectively.  This change means that, for any given location (or, equivalently, any given 
level of amenities), firms and residents have identical preferences for wages, rents and 
amenities in general, but have idiosyncratic attachment to the location (moving costs).  
Because their preferences for wages, rents and amenities are the same, the idea of the 
reservation profits and utility (π and v) is still valid.  This set of assumptions makes it 
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impossible for us to address the sorting aspect of location choice as well as Rosen (1974) 
does.  However, it simplifies the analysis.   
The idiosyncratic attachments to a city could arise for a number of reasons.  For 
people, investments in social ties, location-specific human capital investments (as in 
Krupka (2007)), a sentimental and unreasoning fear of change, uncertainty about other 
cities or a difficult-to-replace job in the current city (such as an academic position) could 
all increase migration costs.  From the perspective of the firm, large investments in fixed 
capital, adaptation to local business norms or the use of locally concentrated distribution 
networks, as well as the personal interests of the firm’s decision makers would generate 
similar attachment to the current location.  In both cases, a purely idiosyncratic taste for 
the area could also exist.  These attachments will vary across individuals.  We find these 
assumptions so descriptively obvious as not to warrant further elaboration.3 
Equations 6 and 7 imply that the indifference curves used in figures 1 and 2 
represent the preferences (or profits) of only one person (or firm).  For any given amenity 
level, rent-wage space will be characterized by a field of V and Π curves, each 
representing a different person or firm.  City population of households and firms will be 
set by the proportion of firms and households for which inequalities 6 and 7 hold, which 
is determined by plugging the left hand side of each inequality into the CDF of the 
idiosyncratic attachments (F and G, respectively).4  In general, for any given amenity 
level, indifference curves more to the left will be consistent with higher populations of 
firms and residents (because rents are lower for any given wage level), while indifference 
                                                 
3 Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) embed such heterogeneity in a core-periphery 
model and show that the heterogeneity is a strong force for dispersion. 
4 In the following, we will normalize the utility and profit functions 
so that reservation utility and profits (v and π) are zero. 
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curves to the right will be associated with fewer residents willing to live in the city at 
those rent-wage combinations.  With population modeled as continuous, this set of 
indifferences curves could be thought of as two surfaces in rent-wage-population space 
sloping down as one moves away from the wage-axis.   
While any rent-wage combination will be an equilibrium for some assumed 
combination of residential and commercial populations, only a subset of them will satisfy 
local labor market equilibrium, where the quantity of jobs equals the number of workers.  
That is, the city’s economy will not be in equilibrium without an additional condition: 
8) . ( ) (( , ; ) ( , ; )G v r w A F r w Aπ= )
Equation 8 requires that the number of jobs be equal to the number of workers.5  Figure 4 
highlights the set of points in rent-wage space where labor market equilibrium is 
achieved.  This set of points could also be thought of as the intersection of the two 
surfaces described above.  
The imposition of labor market equilibrium line in equation 8 does two things.  
First, G-F=0 implicitly defines wage as a function of rents and amenities, w=w(r; A).  In 
Figure 4, w(r; A) is drawn as a straight line with the mildest of positive slopes.  In 








′ ′−= ′ ′− , 
which cannot be signed without further assumptions.  As higher rents drive away both 
firms and residents, the effect of higher rents on equilibrium wage will depend on 
whether these higher rents affect firm location more or less than residential location.    
                                                 
5 To keep things simple, we assume that each resident works and each 
firm hires one worker.  We discuss the effects of relaxing this 
assumption below. 
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The imposition of labor market equilibrium also defines the population of firms 
and residents in the city for any amenity-rent combination.  We define the population of 
residents in the city as ( ) ( )( )( ); , ;r A G v r w r A AΩ = ;
r
.  A similar formulation is available 
for the population of firms in a city.  Ω(r; A) will be important later when we close the 
model.  The effect of rents on city population is easily derived: .  
Because wr is ambiguous, the effect of rents on population may appear ambiguous, but 
the derivative can be shown to be unambiguously negative: higher rents drive down 
population, amenities constant.     
( )r r wG v v w′Ω = +
It is the presence of Ω(r; A) that begins to set the current model apart from the 
Roback (1982) formulation, which neglected population levels for the most part. While 
area population is dealt with in Roback (1980), Roback (1988) and Blomquist et al. 
(1988), population is set by dividing average housing demand into the exogenously 
determined land area, which is defined either as the land area of a county or the amount 
of land available with a certain measured level of amenity.  None of these models allow 
for migration in or out of the area based on amenity, rent or wage levels.  We consider 
this addition to be highly desirable, as it certainly says something about the attractiveness 
of a location if more people live in it.   If there is a small town somewhere in Colorado 
with wages and rents similar to those in San Francisco, the additional information that 
only hundreds of people live in the small town while millions live in San Francisco is 
information which to us seems relevant in terms of understanding the nature of the 
amenities in the two locations.   
While the effects of rents on wages and population are relatively easy to derive, 
the effects of amenities are somewhat muddled by the typology of amenities.  We classify 
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amenities in three categories: productive, nonproductive and unproductive.6  Productive 
amenities increase utility and profits; nonproductive amenities increase utility but do not 
affect profits, and unproductive amenities increase utility but decrease profits.  In general, 
the effects of these kinds of amenities map directly onto the results from the standard 
Roback model, except that it does not yet make sense to talk about the effect of amenities 
on rents, since we have not yet derived equilibrium rents.  Holding rents constant,  








′ ′−= ′ ′− . 
The signs of these partial derivatives will depend on the type of amenity.  Productive 
amenities will increase population but have an ambiguous effect on wages.  
Nonproductive amenities will have a positive effect on population and a negative effect 
on wages.  Unproductive amenities will have a negative effect on wages and an 
ambiguous effect on population. 
For the partial effects above, it was necessary to hold rents constant because 
assuming labor market equilibrium in equation 8 did not actually close the model.  For 
any distribution of moving costs and any level of amenities, there is a continuum of 
possible rent-wage-population combinations.  To close the model, we must also assume 
that the local housing market is also in equilibrium.  Equation 9 defines this condition: 
9) . ( ; ) ( ; ) ( , ( ; ))S r C r A D r w r A= Ω
In equation 9, we introduce the housing supply function, which depends upon rents 
(positively, so that Sr > 0) and other cost factors (so that SC < 0).  The demand for housing 
depends on Ω, or population, and the per-capita demand for housing, D, which depends 
                                                 
6 This 2nd term is new, and we are very open to better ones. 
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on rents and wages.7  Although wr is ambiguous of sign and Dw is positive, we will 
assume that  Dr+Dwwr < 0,  so that a form of the law of demand holds. 
 Equation 9 means that S-ΩD=0 implicitly defines rent as a function of amenities 
and housing cost shifters: r(A, C).  Having equilibrium rents defined allows us to 
determine equilibrium wages, w(r; A).  Together, equilibrium rents and wages allow us to 
determine equilibrium residential (and firm) population, Ω(r; A).  Thus, housing market 
equilibrium closes the model and we are able to derive the effects of any exogenous 
factor on rents, wages or population.  In particular, we are able to derive the effect of a 
change in amenities on the equilibrium rental rate: 
10) ( )A w Ar r r w r
D D wdr
dA S D D D w
Ω +Ω= −Ω −Ω + . 
This amenity effect bears little resemblance to the effect as derived in section I of this 
paper reproducing the Roback capitalization result (equation 3), despite the fact that it 
represents the “marginal” migrant.  This underscores just how much the addition of 
heterogeneous moving costs affects the model.  The Roback “open city” result can be 
reproduced by assuming that G F′ ′=  and taking the limit of equation 10 as these 
quantities approach infinity.8  This exercise confirms that the Roback (1982) 
formalization is a special case of the heterogeneous moving costs model, where moving 
cost heterogeneity is eliminated.  One interesting factor in equation 10 is the Sr term in 
                                                 
G′ F ′
G
7 D represents the combined demand for land for each resident.  This 
includes the resident’s living space as well as his work space.  If 
land and labor are strong complements in production, increases in wages 
will decrease firms’ demand for land while increasing residents’ demand 
for land, making the total effect on demand for land of an increase in 
wage ambiguous.  We will assume that Dw>0, but this assumption is not 
important for our results.  
8  and  enter into equation 10 through the ΩA and Ωr terms, which 
contain wr and wA as well as ′. 
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the denominator.  As this term approaches infinity (as housing is supplied more 
elastically) the rent effect of amenities approaches zero.  This is a formalization of a 
result suggested casually in the conclusion of Glaeser et al. (2006), which is another 
paper stressing the importance of housing supply in the setting of city rents.   
An important result arising from equation 10 is that its sign is actually ambiguous 
for any kind of amenity.  If the amenity in question is productive, the first term in the 
numerator is positive but the second term is ambiguous.  If the amenity is nonproductive, 
the first term is positive while the second term is negative.  Finally, in the case of an 
unproductive amenity (which reduces profits but increases utility), the first term in the 
numerator is ambiguous while the second term is negative.  The denominator is always 
positive.  While ambiguous results are generally not considered as important as ones we 
can sign a priori, we think the ambiguity of equation 10 is an important result in its own 
right.9  It underscores that in the presence of heterogeneous moving costs – which 
certainly exist in the world which generates our data – we know much less about the 
effects of amenities on rents and wages than the Roback open-city formulation suggests. 
Furthermore, the importance of housing market factors both in the setting of 
equilibrium rents (and thus wages), and in equation 10 is new.  While Glaeser et al. 
(2005), Glaeser and Gyourko (2005), and Gyourko et al. (2006) have been moving 
towards this conclusion from other directions, the above frames the importance of 
housing supply directly in a compensating differentials model.  What is important about 
equation 10 is not so much that it is ambiguous of sign, but that it includes several non-
                                                 
9 Blomquist et al. (1988) generate ambiguous effects by assuming that 
population (set as described above) has an ambiguous productivity or 
congestion effect after Tolley (1974).  Much of the ambiguity in 
equation 10 can be resolved if we assume that firms are not 
heterogeneous in moving costs.   
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preference factors, such as housing supply and housing demand parameters and the 
homogeneity of residents and firms (through the ΩA and Ωr terms).  This is an important 
difference from the Roback amenity effect, which depends only on preference and profit 
parameters.  This difference raises questions about the interpretability of the assumed 
hedonic prices derived from hedonic regressions.  If these coefficients reflect elasticities 
of housing demand and supply and the distribution of moving costs among firms and 
people as well as the effects of amenities on utility and profits, how appropriate are they 
as weights in a QOL index? 




= + . 
Because the last term in equation 11 represents the product of two ambiguous terms, this 
effect is also technically ambiguous in sign for all types of amenity.  Taking the limit of 
equation 11 as  approaches infinity confirms (after much tedious algebra) that the 
Roback wage effect (equation 4) is nested inside the heterogeneous moving cost model.  
While we think the ambiguity of sign is important in equation 11, more important is the 
composition of the effect, which includes influences from the housing market as in 
equation 10 as well as all the influences of firm and resident heterogeneity through G
G F′ = ′
′  
and , which appear in both wr and wA.   F ′
 We feel that the heterogeneous moving costs model is an important extension of 
the Roback (1982) model, and that it offers important insights into the nature of inter-area 
price differences and the setting of regional equilibrium in area-specific prices and 
population distributions.  The results above suggest that it would take a very clever 
econometrician to extract appropriate QOL weights from cross-city hedonic regression 
 14
coefficients, which would reproduce empirical estimates of equations 10 and 11.  The 
following section makes three extensions of the model that, we think, further underscore 
its significance either empirically or theoretically.   
 
III. Some Extensions. 
Driving the sign of a partial derivative to ambiguity is not a constructive contribution.  In 
some sense, the simplification of a model is what allows us to get explicit signs in our 
theoretical relationships, and is the entire point of theory.  We believe the empirical 
investigation of the importance of moving costs and amenity capitalization is an 
important next step in our understanding of cities’ interaction and the workings of inter-
city labor markets.  The model also contains several factors not stressed in the original 
theory (wA and wr), but which are in principle observable, so we do not view this model 
as purely destructive or critical.  Instead, we see it as improving our understanding of 
regional equilibrium in prices and populations.  To that end, this section makes a few 
extensions to the heterogeneous moving costs model. 
 
More realistic labor market assumptions 
The imposition of labor market equilibrium in equation 8 assumes that each firm and 
each household demands or supplies a fixed amount of labor.  This unrealistic assumption 
has not been one that has worried most authors in the QOL literature, but we relax it here 
to see if it has any important effects in the context of heterogeneous moving costs.  To do 
so, we re-write equation 8 as follows: 
12)  . ( ) (( , ; ) ( , ; )G v r w A F r w Aσ δ π= )
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In equation 12, σ represents the household supply of labor and δ represents the per-firm 
demand for labor.  As written, equation 12 has added nothing but two constants to the 
analysis.  Allowing σ and δ to be functions of other variables, however, offers a 
straightforward way of assessing the effects of labor market adjustments on the intensive 
margin on the regional equilibrium.   
 The most obvious extension is to allow σ to depend positively on wages and δ to 
depend negatively on wages.  Such a change has no qualitative effect on any of the 
model’s results.  All ambiguous relationships remain so, and none of the relationships we 
had been able to sign become ambiguous or switch sign.  Allowing labor supply and 
demand to depend both on wages and rents also has little effect.  If rents affect the supply 
and demand for labor, the only change in the model is that the effect of rents on wages 
(wr) becomes more difficult to sign than before, and dependent on labor market 
parameters. 
 The only way in which a more realistic labor market has a qualitative effect on the 
results of the model is when labor demand and supply depend on wages, rents and on 
amenities.  Such dependence could occur if amenities and leisure are complements, for 
instance, so that people who live in high amenity areas tend to work less.  Labor demand 
could depend on amenities if amenities are complements to labor (say, because scenic 
mountain views make transport more labor intensive).  If either of these two conditions 
apply (σA<0 or δA>0), the partial effect of amenities on wages, holding rents constant (wA) 
becomes ambiguous for all types of amenities (productive or unproductive).  If neither of 
these conditions apply (neither σA<0 nor δA>0), the model is qualitatively unaffected. 
These two possibilities (σA<0 or δA>0), represent more than half the theoretical 
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possibilities, although the empirical importance of such labor market effects of amenities 
is clearly debatable.  It does bear emphasis that the more realistic labor market 
assumptions will quantitatively change the values of the rent and wage capitalization of 
amenities, even if they have no qualitative effect.  We believe that this puts additional 
burden on econometricians seeking to extract amenity value information from cross-city 
hedonic analysis.   
   
Cost shifters and QOL indices 
The importance of housing supply in equation 10 is one of its contrasts with equation 3.  
The traditional Roback formalization of the effect of amenities on rents did not include 
housing supply factors because with costless migration (at least for the marginal 
migrant), cities with low amenities could not support higher rents driven by local housing 
supply (cost) differences.  To the extent that such differences increased rents, they would 
cause out-migration, thus lowering rents back to the level the local amenities made 
feasible.  When migration costs are heterogeneous, however, cost-related rent increases 
can increase rents locally.  While this will cause some people to move away (those with 
the lowest moving costs), some people will be willing to accept the higher housing costs 
in order to continue to capitalize on their local attachments.  This result is easily shown 




dC S δ δ
−= >−Ω −Ω . 
Given the above discussion, equation 13 is not at all surprising, although it bears 
emphasis that this result was simply unavailable in the Roback framework.  The Roback 
result on local housing costs can be reproduced in this context by allowing Ωr to 
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approach negative infinity.  This drives the denominator towards positive infinity, and the 
derivative as a whole to zero.  Thus, with regard to the effect of housing costs on rents, 
the difference between the heterogeneous moving cost model and the Roback model 
arises from a difference in our assumption on the rent-elasticity of city population.  
Roback implicitly assumes this elasticity is negative infinity, we assume it is something 
larger than that.   
 While equation 13 is not too surprising, a more important result is available if we 
allow for the existence of some amenities that affect the cost of land or of construction.  
There are many reasons why amenities may cause land to be more costly.  For instance, 
in the canonical model of the monocentric city, high agricultural yields increase the 
opportunity cost of land city-wide.  Such high agricultural yields could be the result of 
favorable climate.  Rough terrain or large swaths of undevelopable area (such as water or 
national parks) could also increase the cost of land in a city by making land scarce or 
forcing longer commutes over or around these obstacles.  Gyourko and Saiz (2006) show 
that topography also appears to have a positive direct effect on construction costs.  As 
such features also offer considerable scenic and recreational value (are amenities) and 
sometimes increase profits (through shipping on coasts or mining in mountains) these 
features have two effects on local rents.  First, they may increase them because of their 
value as amenities.  Second, they will increase rents through their effect on land or 
construction costs in the metro area.  Other factors that could have similar effects 
(through both amenity and cost effects) would include the risk of natural disaster or 
regulations restricting development such as a binding urban growth boundary or 
reactionary zoning (Glaeser et al. (2005)).   
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 The effects on rents of such supply-restricting amenities will be different from 
those that do not restrict supply, as shown in equation 14. 






−Ω −Ω= − −Ω −Ω . 
Equation 14 differs from equation 10 in that the term SCCA has been added.  This term 
represents the amenity’s effect on the supply function through the cost term.   What is 
somewhat troubling is that most natural amenities that leap to mind – coasts, mountains, 
parks – either restrict developable land or increase the cost of development.  On the other 
hand, most cultural amenities have no supply effect.  Equation 14 tells us that such 
cultural amenities will appear to be less important in the rental equation of a cross-city 
hedonic model than natural amenities that restrict housing supply.  While equation 14 is 
still ambiguous for every kind of amenity, it is unambiguously greater when the amenity 
causes greater supply restrictions.10   
 The existence of this change in the effects of amenities on rents (and thus wages) 
is troubling because the QOL literature uses the effects of amenities on rents and wages 
as weights in the construction of all-encompassing QOL indices.  Roback’s beautifully 
argued theory leads us to believe that in estimating such weights, we are estimating 
equation 3 in the rent equation.  However, heterogeneous moving costs imply that in fact 
we are estimating equation 10.  While equation 10 may still be defensible as a weight in 
such an index, the situation is actually worse.  For some amenities we are estimating 
equation 10, while for other, supply-restricting amenities, we are estimating equation 14, 
which will vary depending on the amenity’s effect on construction costs, CA.  The net 
                                                 
10 This result could be confirmed by taking the derivative of equation 
14 with respect to CA. 
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effect of this is that QOL indices will tend to overemphasize the value of supply-
restricting amenities relative to supply-neutral amenities, and thus rank areas with high 
levels of supply-restricting amenities higher in quality of life indices than areas 
specializing in more supply-neutral amenities.  Even approaches which avoid the direct 
estimation of equation 14 (as in Kahn (1995) and Cragg and Kahn (1997)) will be 
affected by this supply-restricting effect because the lower supply of housing in some 
areas will be pushing rents up, making them look more attractive.  It is unlikely that this 
bias will be cancelled out by the information from the cross-city wage hedonic.  
Examining equations 5 and 11, we see that this canceling out of the bias could occur if wr 
were exactly one.  However, we cannot even be sure that wr is positive, let a lone equal to 
one.  If wr < 0, the wage side of the QOL index will actually exacerbate the bias 
introduced in the rent equation.  
 We are not the first to suggest that coefficients from the cross-city hedonic might 
be biased.  Gyourko et al (1991) make a similar point with regard to local public finance 
issues.  However, the bias we highlight here is perhaps more vexing because, empirically, 
correcting for this tendency will be extremely difficult.  As we do not observe the value 
people and businesses place on certain characteristics, or the level and patterns of 
development that would have occurred in the absence of the supply-restricting features, it 
will be very difficult to determine how much supply has been restricted in a given urban 
area and how much rents have responded to that supply restriction, as opposed to the 
utility- and/or profit-enhancing aspects of the features restricting supply.  However, 
without making such a distinction, it is hard to imagine how the coefficients in a cross-
city hedonic would be appropriate in assigning weights to area characteristics, even 
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laying aside the concerns raised in section II.  Such coefficients may be reflecting the 
high average moving costs of an area’s population as much as the great value the citizens 
place on their local characteristics.   
 
Compensating differentials and agglomeration. 
An objection to the model above is that it derives a negative relationship between rents 
and city population, and an indeterminate relationship between wages and rents.  These 
results do not square with the strong correlation amongst wages, rents and city population 
as noted by Glaeser and Maré (2001).  This apparent inconsistency is resolved by 
recalling that the negative relationship between rents and population and the ambiguous 
relationship between wages and rents holds only when the levels of amenities are held 
constant.   
 Of course, amenities differ across cities, so the partial relationship among 
population, rents and wages with amenities held constant – while important for our 
analytical results – is not of much use empirically.  The positive correlation between 
rents, wages and population suggests the importance of productive amenities with much 
greater effects on firm costs than on individuals’ utility.  One might call these firm or 
business amenities.11  In the model above, such non-utility enhancing amenities increase 
the attractiveness of a location for businesses but not for residents.  In symbols, πA>>0, 
but vA = 0.  Plugging these values into the appropriate formulas generates wA >0 and 
                                                 
11 We make the distinction between firm amenities and productive 
amenities because amenities as usually treated are assumed to increase 
utility, while amenities are described as productive or unproductive 
depending on their effect on profits.  A firm amenity would be assumed 
to benefit profits and could be characterized further by distinguishing 
between firm amenities that enhance or detract from utility. 
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ΩA>0.  The higher population and higher wages imply higher demand for housing in the 
city in question, and thus higher rents, as can be seen by plugging the derived partials into 
equation 10.  Thus if sites differ in the amount of this firm amenity, even if housing 
supply is the same across sites, the higher firm amenity sites could have higher 
populations, rents and wages in equilibrium. 
 However, because higher rents then have indirect effects on population and 
wages, the situation is not so simple.  Equation 11 states that the effect on wages of 
amenities consists of a direct effect of amenities on wages (wA which we know is 
positive) and an indirect effect through the amenity’s effect on rents.  This indirect effect 
depends on wr, which is of ambiguous sign.  If wr is positive or near zero (or the rental 
effect is small), then the firm amenity’s effect on wages will be positive.  Strong negative 
relationships between rents and wages (amenities held constant) will imply ambiguous 
equilibrium relationships between wages and firm amenities.  While technically 
ambiguous in sign, one might be willing to hazard a guess that this effect is in fact 
positive. 
 The effects of firm amenities on area population are quite a bit more ambiguous.  




Ω = Ω +Ω r . 
The first term of equation 15 is unambiguously positive, while the second term is 
unambiguously negative.  Stacking the deck in favor of a positive sign is also difficult.  
For instance, assuming a very large direct effect (ΩA>>0), will also increase the negative 
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indirect effect (because dr/dA is a positive function of ΩA).  Decreasing the population 
effect of rent (Ωr) will tend to increase the rent effect of the firm amenitiy (because dr/dA 
is a negative function of Ωr).  Thus, the heterogeneous moving costs model does not 
generate a cross-sectional positive correlation amongst rents, wages and city population. 
 If the firm amenities discussed above exist as features of the landscape, then we 
call them “natural advantage.”  The results here suggest that a natural advantage story 
based on an exogenous increase in some factor which increases profits but has little effect 
on utility does not explain an important aspect of economic geography.  On the other 
hand, if these firm amenities arise endogenously as a product of larger population, we call 
them agglomeration or urbanization economies, and we employ a very different set of 
theoretical tools in understanding them.  An interpretation of the ambiguous results above 
is that exogenous features of the landscape cannot explain the patterns of rents, wages 
and city population we observe.  That is, amenities do not cause large populations.  On 
the other hand, these results suggest that the opposite story might be the case.  Large 
populations must generate amenities.  The story which emerges from this perspective is 
that larger populations generate firm amenities, which increase wages and rents.  
 Interest in agglomeration economies has been increasing since Krugman’s 
seminal 1991 Journal of Political Economy piece synthesized many older strands from 
the regional science literature to generate a micro-theory general equilibrium model that 
exhibited strong divergence and several interesting dynamic possibilities.  Ottaviano and 
Thisse (2004) offer a review of the substantial theoretical literature that followed.  Other 
authors have offered other avenues from which similar dynamics might arise.12    It has 
                                                 
12 Glaeser (1999), Berry and Glaeser (2005) and Helseley and Strange (1990) are a few.  Also see 
Duranton and Puga (2004) for a review of some of the more current theories.   
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been difficult to assess the implications of this literature on the more neoclassical 
regional literature that follows Roback partly because Roback’s model is mute on the 
scale of the city.  By bringing city size into the analysis, the assumption of heterogeneous 
moving costs allows for a connection between the QOL literature and the newer 
agglomeration literature because amenities can be produced endogenously.  We believe 
this extension is extremely important since almost any amenity imaginable (with the 
exception of climate, terrain and possibly water cover) is endogenously generated by 
local populations.  Cultural amenities, professional sports teams, land cover, architectural 
beauty, infrastructure, public services and a host of new economic geographic 
agglomeration economies and human capital externalities all arise endogenously from the 
local population.  We see this as an important next step in our understanding of 
amenities.  Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) embed amenities in an agglomeration model, but 
the amenities are assumed exogenous.  The entire new economic geography theoretical 
literature can be seen as an attempt to build microfoundations for a set of endogenous 
firm amenities.  Here we stress that the set of endogenous amenities that exist in the real 
world are much broader than those modeled in the recent agglomeration literature, and 
constitute most of the things that make cities cities, as opposed to overgrown towns.    
 While obviously lacking in microfoundation for the urbanization economies 
hypothesized, we believe this framework is attractive in that it is flexible enough to 
extend to additional analysis, which we do not pursue in this more limited paper.  For 
instance, Roback, most of the agglomeration literature and this paper all assume perfectly 
functioning labor markets.  This model is flexible enough to add labor market 
imperfections and/or dynamic labor market adjustments with local unemployment as an 
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output.  Such a dynamic extension of this static model could shed light on the cyclicality 
of employment, wages and rents, and how that cyclicality may (or may not) be 
conditioned by agglomeration externalities or amenities.   
A more dynamic frame for the model could also yield insight into the longer-term 
fates of economic regions.  While most productive amenities will increase rent, some will 
favor businesses more than others.  Highly firm-oriented amenities will tend to increase 
rent and wage both, while more resident-oriented amenities will tend to increase rent 
alone.  Differences in these kinds of amenities (football stadiums versus stock markets) 
would thus exhibit themselves in different relative changes in rents and wages as 
population increases.  If one views the historical development of a city as the slow 
drawing out of a curve in rent-wage-population space, the difference in kinds of 
amenities suggests that at any given point in time, the future course of the curve could 
depend on the kinds of agglomeration economies generated by the city’s growth.  Over 
time, these kinds of agglomeration economies could be affected by random chance, 
cultural or historical factors, or deliberate government decisions.  As the national and 
global economy changes, relative values of different endogenous amenities might change, 
affecting the capitalization into wages and rents.  Some cities might be left on growth 
paths that become non-optimal under the new prices.  As they cannot go back in time, 
such changes could require painful transitions in the local economy.  From this 
perspective, it becomes possible to begin asking questions about optimal growth paths in 
a much more nuanced way.   
 Whether these broadly drawn suggestions bear more formal fruit remains to be 
seen.  Here we have merely drawn the connection between the line of research using a 
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neoclassical form of regional equilibrium following Roback and the agglomeration 
literature that has blossomed over the last decade and a half.  As the QOL literature rests 
heavily on the assumption of a neoclassical regional equilibrium, and considering the 
recent importance of the agglomeration literature in both general interest and regional 
journals, we believe such a connection is crucial in the understanding of local quality of 
life comparisons and their relevance in a world of increasing returns.  Hopefully the 
agglomeration literature will also benefit from the bridge between the two branches of 
regional economics.   
 
IV.  Conclusion 
This paper has made a minor modification to the compensating differential model 
formalized by Roback (1982).  By allowing for heterogeneous moving costs, the model’s 
output changed considerably.  First, the solution method used by Roback and those 
following her does not close the model: wages and rents do not depend only on amenities 
and preference parameters, but on a host of other factors.  Second, implications for city 
population, which had been missing, are drawn out.  Third, the vital importance of local 
housing market conditions comes to the fore.  The model is not closed without local land 
supply, and the interaction between land supply and amenities can be seen as completely 
determining both rents and wages.  Fourth, the theoretical partial derivatives of amenities 
on rents and wages become ambiguous in sign for all amenity types, and contain many 
extraneous terms which lead us to question their appropriateness as weights in QOL 
indices when they are derived from hedonic regressions.  These results lead us to wonder 
whether such indices are even possible.  Fifth, we show that if there is a relationship 
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(either causal or coincidental) between certain amenities and local land supply, QOL 
indices that use regression coefficients as weights will be biased in favor of areas with 
high concentrations of supply-reducing amenities.  Finally, the inclusion of city size as an 
output of the model offers a bridge between the amenities or quality of life literature and 
the agglomeration literature that has been so important over the past decade.  We 
consider these all to be significant contributions.   
 More generally, we consider it an important step in the literature in terms of 
generating testable hypotheses from the Roback model.  The logic behind Roback’s 
original paper was so forceful, and her exposition so clear that we believe that it has been 
easy to be blinded to the fact that the theory does not actually offer any testable 
hypotheses, except perhaps that wages and rents differ systematically across cities.  
Given that, however, any combination of rent and wage coefficients could be rationalized 
with the model by assuming that the characteristic in question was either productive or 
unproductive; an amenity or a disamenity.  Roback thus provides us with more of a 
perspective for interpreting inter-city wage and rent differentials than a theory explaining 
them.   
 This paper suffers from many of the same limitations as the Roback paper.  For 
instance, we assume that the city and system of cities is in equilibrium.  We assume good 
information flows exits.  The model is not dynamic.  Foremost of these shared 
deficiencies is the fact that it is difficult to imagine a data set that could confirm the 
existence, for instance, of the supply restriction effect on prices.  Any cross-sectional or 
time-series evidence can be explained by assuming a feature constricting supply is a 
productive amenity.  Nonetheless, we hope that by beginning to force our gaze on 
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alternative explanations and alternative interpretations of the data we can continue the 
process of assessing the validity of Roback’s assumptions.  This is an important process 
because those assumptions determine the validity of the QOL indices based on them.    
These assumptions also imply a view of the important determinants of metropolitan 
prices.  We have shown here that heterogeneous moving costs, if important, radically 
change the interpretation of inter-city price differentials and cast into doubt the possibility 
of a valid QOL index.  We feel our assumptions are more realistic.  What remains to be 
seen is whether the practical significance of the differences in results substantially 
changes our attitudes about such indices or about inter-area price differentials more 
generally.   
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Figure 1: equilibrium in the Roback Model 
 




















Figure 4: Local labor market equilibirum 
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